No talks with Maoists

By Radhavinod Raju

Naxal literature that is available gives some idea about their ideology, and their future plans. Analysis of various tactics and strategies employed by them in fighting the security forces, mistakes made and corrective actions taken, all are discussed threadbare. A thorough study of all their literature, and lessons drawn by our own forces during various clashes with the Naxals in rural and forest settings, the various types of weapons employed by them, including sophisticated firearms and improvised explosive devices etc, should help in drawing appropriate strategies to neutralise them. Their current area of operation includes far flung tribal settlements and forests in remote areas in Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

Twelve Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans were killed and 28 injured when suspected Maoists triggered a landmine blast at Pushtola in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra, late last month. Some companies of CRPF were to be posted at Pomke Gatta. The CRPF unit was reported to be on its way from Karvafa to Gatta for road opening and area domination. When they approached Pushtola between 11.30 am and noon, the Naxalites blasted the landmine. The jawans were travelling in a bus. Obviously the Naxals in the area had received intelligence about the CRPF movement, resulting in the planning and execution of the ambush. The abduction of Italian tourists in Odisha, one of whom was released subsequently, and the abduction of a BJD MLA about whose fate there is no information, shows the Naxals active in different theatres, and that they may have recovered from the loss of their leader Kishenji late last year.

As soon as he took over, the Union home minister P Chidambaram had ambitious plans of bringing in all the Naxal-affected states together in one platform and of working out a common strategy to go after the Naxals. In between, Chidambaram also called upon the Naxals to shun violence and join the government for talks. It soon became clear that all the states were not on board and some still wanted to bring them round by talks. While there were a few operational successes for the security forces, there were serious setbacks too, as when the Naxals massacred 76 CRPF jawans in Dantewada in Chhattisgarh in April 2010. It would be interesting to compare the tactics and strategies of the Naxals and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Prabhakaran’s remarkable outfit which appeared to be unbeatable till the Sri Lankan Army launched an all-out war against the outfit.

In the late Eighties, it was suspected that the Naxals had linked up with the LTTE, and that the latter had provided them sophisticated arms like AK47s, and training in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in which the LTTE were masters. The maximum number of casualties that the LTTE inflicted on the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the Mullaitivu jungles were through IEDs. That in 1989, for the first time the security forces were attacked by the Naxals with sophisticated arms and the extensive use of IEDs was a pointer to the Naxal-LTTE link. As long as the LTTE indulged in a guerilla war with the Sri Lankan security forces, they continued to hold fort. If they were defeated in one sector, they inflicted defeats on the Sri Lankans in another sector. When we look at the movement of the Naxals, we find them attacking in one sector, and as the security forces get in, they move into another area.

A recent report said that the Maoists have mastered the skill of making weapons, and that the weapons recently seized in Guntur consisted of grenades, rifles, rocket launchers and booby traps. Even the LTTE had developed skills to manufacture weapons and grenades. In 1989, a factory in Coimbatore was located by the local police as an LTTE foundry, manufacturing grenade shells. They shifted location of the factory and continued to manufacture shells from there and no stringent action was taken. It was only after the Rajiv Gandhi assassination that the LTTE’s units in Tamil Nadu were shut for good.

Each time he entered into talks with Colombo. Prabhakaran used the time to recoup his losses, go for fresh recruitment and training, and procure arms. His objective, however, always remained Tamil Eelam. Had he been let off the hook in May 2009 by the Sri Lankans, there is no doubt that he would have regrouped his forces, and attacked the Lankans. Several state governments in India have tried to talk with the Naxals, but not once did the talks move forward beyond initial statements. From a rag-tag force of a few dozens in the Eighties, the Naxals have grown into a formidable guerilla force, and their objective, as in the case of the LTTE, has remained unchanged — forcibly overthrow the democratically elected governments, and take over. This is something that all our politicians have to understand.

The CRPF has been galvanised by its new chief, who has always led by example. He has camped with his men in the deepest jungles, raising their morale. He has also been working closely with the state police chiefs, for without their wholehearted cooperation, no operation can succeed. Then what went wrong in Gadchiroli? It appears that all are not still on board in the strategy against the Naxals. It would be worthwhile to find out how the Naxals could meticulously plan the operation in Gadchiroli and eliminate so many jawans, and who passed on information about the CRPF movement into the area? The earlier politicians understand the working of the Naxals, and see the close likeness of the outfit with the LTTE, the better for the country. We cannot go for an all-out war with the Naxals as the Sri Lankans did against the LTTE — we have to be conscious about the collateral damage and civilian casualties that might result in such action. Hence, to succeed, all the political masters in the affected states, and the police chiefs, should work closely with the Centre and the CRPF — any deviation from such a focussed policy will only benefit the Naxals.

(Views expressed in the column are the author’s own) 

Radhavinod Raju 

is a former director general of the National Investigation Agency. E-mail: radhavinodraju@gmail.com 

New Indian Express

08th April 2012