Afghanistan-Pakistan drama shifts base

By Radhavinod Raju

Mullah Omar’s Taliban is setting up office in Qatar to open negotiations with the United States. It is said that Washington is keen to hold talks with the Taliban outside Pakistan, to curtail its influence on the talks. The Pakistanis herded the Taliban leadership out of Afghanistan before the Americans attacked that country in the wake of 9/11. Though Pakistan has consistently denied this, Mullah Omar and his companions were safely ensconced in safe houses of the ISI in Quetta, and were popularly known as the Quetta Shura. Obviously the Pakistanis believed that the US would pack up and leave Afghanistan sooner than later. Though they may have erred in the timeline, it is a fact that the Americans are ready to leave, and have been looking for an honourable exit route out of Afghanistan. The Pakistani plan was to use the Quetta Shura to establish their influence in Kabul in a future dispensation there, and cut down India’s role. While saying that they support a peace process between and among the Afghans themselves, Pakistan has been trying to get the Western Powers to accept a role for the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani group in the peace process.

The account of Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, former ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan, given in his book My Life With the Taliban is interesting. According to Mullah Zaeef ‘..the ISI acts at will, abusing and overruling the elected government whenever they deem it necessary. It is a military intelligence administration that is led by Pakistan’s military commanders. It is the combined clandestine services, civil and military. It shackles, detains and releases, and at times it assassinates. Its operations often take place far beyond its own borders, in Afghanistan, India or in Iran’. He further notes: ‘The wolf and sheep may drink water from the same stream, but since the start of the jihad the ISI extended its roots deep into Afghanistan like a cancer puts down roots in the human body; every ruler of Afghanistan complained about it, but none could get rid of it’. From Mullah Zaeef’s account, it appears that the Taliban were themselves not happy about the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan, but had no choice but to accept their protection following the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001.

Going back to early 2010, one recalls the arrest of a senior Taliban commander, next only to Mullah Omar, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, initially reported to be in a joint operation of the CIA and the Pakistani forces. Subsequent reports challenged this account; one said that the Pakistanis were after Baradar who was engaged in secret talks with the Afghan government keeping the Pakistanis out. While they found him to be in Karachi, they could not pinpoint his exact location. That is why they used the CIA to locate him with their technology, without the CIA knowing exactly who they were after. According to a New York Times report, ‘..seven months later, Pakistani officials are telling a very different story. They say they set out to capture Baradar, and used the CIA to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan, the Taliban’s long-time backer’. According to reports doing the rounds in Islamabad at the time, Pakistan’s policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan was to retain decisive influence over the Taliban, thwart arch-enemy India and place Pakistan in a position to shape Afghanistan’s post-war political order. From this it is clear that the Taliban was not averse to getting into talks with Karzai’s government or with the Americans.

Where does that leave the Pakistanis? They still protect the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar. They also have considerable influence over the Haqqani network. The Pakistanis withstood a lot of American pressure to go after the Haqqani network. Kayani gave excuses like his forces are overstretched, and that they will decide on the timing of the action, etc in order not to attack the Haqqani group. The NATO attack on the two Pakistani posts resulting in the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers in November 2011 has given Kayani a much-needed breather from American pressure. They have stopped all cooperation with the US saying the relationship between the two countries is under review of the parliament, and further cooperation will be based on a fresh assessment of the rules of engagement. Taxes on NATO supplies through Pakistan and ban on drone strikes are said to be on the agenda.

Though the Americans had realised sometime back that the Pakistanis, who were dependent on generous US aid, were double-crossing them in Afghanistan, yet they continued to maintain a facade of cooperation as they themselves depended on Pakistani cooperation in the war on terror. Pakistan knows that the US cannot do without its assistance, and Washington knows that Islamabad depended on its largesse to run the country. While there is a stalemate now, both are eager to break the impasse. A breakthrough, with face-saving clauses and statements can be expected sooner than later. Where does that leave the peace negotiations between the Taliban and the US?

Pakistan will insist on a role for itself in any future set up in Afghanistan. Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is visiting Qatar, to give a brief on Pakistan’s perspective of the peace process. That Gilani has decided to go to Qatar, in spite of the crisis at home, speaks about the importance of the mission. If insights gained from Mullah Zaeef’s accounts and Mullah Baradar’s arrest are anything to go by, how the Taliban itself will view Pakistan’s future role in running their affairs is not clear. Will they accept the Afghan constitution? Will they be willing to share power with the other stakeholders? Will they be given complete sway over the south and east Afghanistan in order to buy peace, a la former Ambassador Blackwill’s proposal to bifurcate Afghanistan? The current dispensation in Afghanistan would view any Pakistani role with suspicion, and will certainly not accept any dominant role for the Taliban in a future set up. As the drama slowly unfolds in Qatar, not only Kabul and Islamabad, but even Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi will watch it with keen interest.

(Views expressed in the column are the author’s own) Radhavinod Raju  is a former director general of the National Investigation Agency. E-mail: radhavinodraju@gmail.com 

New Indian Express

07th February 2012