Lessons from hostage crises
The Pakistan-backed insurgency in Jammu &
Kashmir has been going on since late 1989. December of that year marks a
watershed in the evolution of the insurgency when, following the appointment of
Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as Union home minster, his daughter Rubaiya Sayeed was
abducted by militants of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a militant
organisation that was spearheading the insurgency. They received a tremendous
boost when five top JKLF militants, earlier arrested by the J&K police,
were released in exchange for Rubaiya. The morale of the police, which was
fighting the insurgency without proper training or equipment, nose-dived. It
took over three years for the J&K police to recover from this blow, and
join the mainstream in fighting the insurgency. This proved to be a game
changer, and that is how we were able to control this foreign-backed assault on
our sovereignty.
There have been other cases of abduction in Jammu
& Kashmir, of soft targets who did not have security, or in the earlier
days of insurgency, due to mistakes made by the abducted persons due to lack of
experience. The cases of H L Khera, general manager of HMT and Mushirul-Haq,
vice chancellor of Kashmir
University Pakistan
One of the important tasks of the police was to
draw a list of local political leaders, perceived to be pro-India, who faced
genuine threats to their life. Quite a number of them, especially from the
National Conference, had been eliminated, and there was a political vacuum in
the Valley during 1990-1993. They were categorised according to threat
perceptions, and placed in appropriate categories of security. According to the
gradation, the lowest category would fetch the protected person a Personal
Security Officer, or PSO. For the next higher category person, there were two
PSOs and a guard at home. For the next higher category, an escort was also
provided along with the PSOs and a guard at home. Similarly, lists of
vulnerable installations, areas and points were also drawn for special
attention. These included houses of important leaders, bridges, buildings,
airports, dams, etc. Some political leaders who had to move around in the
Valley were provided with bullet-proof vehicles. While there have been
allegations of misuse of men and material in the name of security, no risk
could be taken in withdrawing security without proper assessment of security
needs. There was a system in place, consisting of the district special branch,
the state CID special branch and the Intelligence Bureau, whose officers met
regularly to review security of political leaders, officers working in the
field and other categories like Amarnath Yatra, etc.
While there have been attacks on officers and
political leaders on the move, in their office or even at their homes,
including on the police headquarters, the security has always responded, and
made it costly for the terrorists to indulge in such attacks. Improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) were used to assassinate minister of state for home
Mushtaq Lone. The DIG of Anantnag was attacked in another IED assault just
outside his office, and seriously injured. However, the fight went on, with
security forces gaining the upper hand and learning from mistakes, but moving
ahead with determination.
One serious setback happened when an Indian
Airlines aircraft with over a hundred passengers was hijacked by Pakistani
terrorists in December, 1999. The terrorists wanted several of their colleagues
in Indian prisons to be released in exchange for the aircraft and passengers.
Topping the list was Azhar Masood, who had been arrested by the security forces
in 1994, and was in prison in Jammu & Kashmir. His release caused us the
maximum harm, in that he returned to Pakistan
and formed the Jaish-e-Mohammad, which was responsible for the attack on the
Indian Parliament in 2001 December, on the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly in
October, 2001, and many attacks in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India
The Pakistanis had earlier, in 1994, abducted six
foreigners, including two Americans and Britons each, one Norwegian and a
German to get the release of Azhar Masood. One of the abducted persons escaped
from their custody, one was beheaded, while the remaining four were reported to
have been also killed by the terrorists, once it became clear that the Indians
would not oblige them by releasing Azhar Masood. On both occasions, when five
JKLF terrorists were released in exchange for Rubaiya Sayeed and when Azhar
Masood and two other terrorists were released in exchange for the hijacked
Indian Airlines aircraft with the passengers, the state government was against
release of the terrorists — it was the central government that caved in and
brought pressure on the state government to release the terrorists. There was
no instance of any officer being abducted and demands being made for release of
arrested terrorists.
It is not clear whether the abducted district
collector of Sukna, in Chhattisgarh, Alex Paul Menon, was entitled for only two
PSOs when he went into the Naxal infested area, or that he did not take his
full detail of security in order to ensure that people were not scared to
openly come and meet him. In either case, it is a serious security lapse, which
would be forgotten as soon as Menon is released and there is all-round euphoria
to celebrate the event. The sacrifice of the security forces in nabbing wanted
terrorists would soon be forgotten. Nobody would appear to be concerned about
the state of their morale. And then it is business as usual.
(Views expressed in the column are
the author’s own) Radhavinod Raju is a former director general of the National
Investigation Agency. E-mail: radhavinodraju@gmail.com
New Indian Express
30th April 2012
