Jammu and Kashmir: The Way Forward
Radhavinod Raju
During an academic discussion in a New Delhi think tank, a Jammu based scholar referred to two conflicts pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir, the conflict in Kashmir and the conflict of Kashmir. The conflict in Kashmir was traced to as early as 1931, when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah led the Kashmiris’ fight for their rights against the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict of Kashmir started after partition, between India and Pakistan, after the Indian army landed in Srinagar following the signing of the instrument of accession by the Maharajah in favour of India after the Pakistanis invaded the valley to forcibly annex Kashmir to Pakistan. More than the instrument of accession, it was the trust and friendship between two mass leaders, one of all India and the other of Kashmir that bound Kashmir to India. The trust, friendship, respect and regard that developed between Jawaharlal Nehru, a Kashmiri pandit, and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in the mid and late thirties, when India and Kashmir were struggling against entrenched powers, brought Kashmir and India together to a shared destiny. After India approached the United Nations on Kashmir, Jinnah objected to a plebiscite primarily because of Sheikh Abdullah’s backing of India (Akbar 2002: 122). Jinnah knew that an overwhelming majority of the people of the Muslim majority state were solidly behind the Sheikh. When Pakistani raiders were looting and raping Kashmiris in Baramullah, the initial brunt of their attacks was bravely faced by the volunteers of the National Conference consisting of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs.
After Sheikh Abdullah took over as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, the conflict in Kashmir came to an end, though the conflict of Kashmir between India and Pakistan intensified. Kashmiris rejoiced over the land reforms that the Sheikh introduced soon after. By this one move, the Sheikh gave to his people their lost pride and dignity, along with ownership of the land they tilled. Hunger was thereby banished forever from Kashmir. In his address to the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah said: “The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim state, and a big majority of our people being Muslims the state must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim state is of course only a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal state in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power…” (Akbar 2002: 141). The Sheikh’s words seem prophetic even today. Earlier, in the same address, arguing in favour of accession to India, Sheikh Abdullah said: “The real character of a nation is revealed in its Constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of a secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bedrock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus…” (Akbar 2002: 141). In the course of this address, the Sheikh also touched upon the subject of independence for Kashmir. He said “I would like to remind you that from August 15 to October 22, 1947, our state was independent and the result was that our weakness was exploited by the neighbour with invasion. What is the guarantee that in future too we may not be victims of similar aggression?” (Akbar 2002: 142). The Sheikh’s arrest and subsequent incarceration in 1953 was a betrayal of the deep trust that had earlier marked the relations between him and Nehru. It also revived the conflict in Kashmir which took menacing forms in the shape of the Plebiscite Front, set up by Sheikh Abdullah’s deputy, Mirza Afzal Beg, on 9 August 1955, demanding plebiscite.
The circumstances in which Jammu and Kashmir became part of India were special. India had gone to the United Nations on the issue against Pakistan, and had offered a plebiscite after fulfilling certain conditions on the ground. In the meanwhile, the special relations between the government of India and Jammu and Kashmir were enshrined in the Indian Constitution in the shape of Article 370. Jammu and Kashmir was the only state of the Union which had its own Constitution, its own flag and a law which prevented outsiders from acquiring property in the state - this was only allowed for state subjects. Any new law passed by the Indian Parliament had to be ratified by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly for it to become law in the state. The Government of India was to handle defence, communication and foreign policy alone. Sheikh Abdullah had to face some opposition from his own party even when he changed the name of the party from Muslim Conference to National Conference in the late thirties. This had led to a split in the party. It was the Sheikh’s passionate belief in democracy and secularism that had made him throw his full weight behind Nehru and India, though there were dissenting voices within the National Conference. The activities of the Praja Parishad in Jammu at this time, with stridently communal overtones may have prompted the Sheikh, during his address to the Constituent Assembly, to refer to such tendencies. He said: “Certain tendencies have been asserting themselves in India that may in the future convert it into a religious state wherein the interests of the Muslims will be jeopardised. This would happen if a communal organization had a dominant hand in the government, and Congress ideals of equality of all communities were made to give way to a religious intolerance” (Akbar 2002: 142). Nevertheless it was the trust in Nehru and the safeguards in the Indian Constitution that won the day. However, the trust that had kept the bond between Nehru and the Sheikh strong gradually started eroding with entrenched interests in Delhi creating misunderstandings between them, finally resulting in the Sheikh’s dismissal and arrest. In the years between the Sheikh’s arrest and his return to mainstream politics, Article 370 had become diluted to a large extent.
Having realised that they cannot forcibly take away Kashmir from India, Pakistan prepared for a long drawn struggle using non-state actors to destabilise Kashmir. The plan was to take it from India at the appropriate moment. Pakistani agents were in touch with several individual members of the plebiscite front, to create disaffection among Kashmiris against the Government of India. But such elements were in a minority, and could not create much of an impact. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war in which India got worsted, Pakistan made a bold attempt to get Kashmir in 1965, in an operation codenamed Gibraltar - first by infiltrating its agents to tie up with sleeper cells in the valley to create an uprising against India, and then by sending their regulars to attack India. Nomadic tribesmen of Jammu and Kashmir, who saw these agents on the borders, immediately alerted the local police, finally leading to the breaking up of the spy rings. This would show that while there were some elements that were hostile to India among the Kashmiris, they were in a minority.
Nevertheless, anti-India elements continued their efforts to destabilise Kashmir, and in the late sixties and early seventies, the al Fatah emerged in the valley, with active connivance from across the border, to create more trouble. This organization was soon shattered by the local police. The police leadership was able to identify a number of educated youth who had been misled into the al Fatah, and succeeded in weaning them away from this self-destructive path. Several of them joined the administration and rose to senior ranks, making useful contribution to society, while many others joined the political mainstream. However, there were elements which continued to have disaffection for India, and persisted with their efforts to destabilise Kashmir, with covert assistance from the Pakistani government. Mohammad Maqbool Bhat from north Kashmir was one of the leaders of this group. Bhat was soon apprehended by the police in connection with the murder of a bank manager in south Kashmir, and after a due trial, was sentenced to death. This was after the break-up of Pakistan, and India’s decisive victory over that country in the 1971 war. This was soon followed by the Indira-Sheikh Abdullah talks and the return of the Sheikh to mainstream politics in early 1975.
The new government of Jammu and Kashmir was headed by Sheikh Abdullah, with the support of the Congress, which was ruling the state at the time of the accord. Sheikh Abdullah’s return was followed by the dissolution of the plebiscite front, and the re-emergence of the National Conference which had played such a crucial role in Kashmir’s history. The conflict in Kashmir, which had been revived after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953, was thus once again resolved.
There were elements in Kashmir, however, which were not happy with the Indira-Sheikh Abdullah accord, and continued their destabilising activities, with clandestine support of Pakistani intelligence agencies. However, the towering figure of Sheikh Abdullah, with his undiminished popularity with the masses of Kashmir, was a deterrent against the machinations of these elements. The Congress was voted out of power in Delhi in the general elections in 1977, and this was soon followed by the Congress withdrawing support to the Sheikh Abdullah government in Kashmir. However, in the assembly elections held in mid-1977, the National Conference led by the redoubtable Sheikh Abdullah, returned to power with a thumping majority in what is widely believed to be the first clean elections held in the state. In a long time, the Kashmiris were allowed to elect a leader of their choice through the democratic process. One of the arguments of some intellectuals of Jammu and Kashmir was that they joined India after partition though they were a Muslim majority state primarily because of the secular and democratic values that the Congress, which led India to independence, professed. However, while every other part of India reaped the benefits of democracy, Kashmir was denied its fruits. This was in reference to Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest and his 22 year long incarceration, and the alleged fraudulent electoral processes in the valley till the return of the Sheikh to mainstream politics.
Speaking in the Lok Sabha after the Accord, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said: “...It is particularly praiseworthy that Sheikh Abdullah, overcoming whatever bitterness he might have had, should have clasped the hand of friendship extended to him. He has done this in the larger interest of Kashmir and of the country as a whole and of the cause which is dear to him, namely the strengthening of democracy and secularism” (Akbar 2002: 189). She ended her defence of the Kashmir accord with the remarks that “…it is not so much the legal niceties involved in the accord which matter as much as the substance of the achievement which Sheikh Abdullah has described as the re-establishment of the trust and confidence….” It is this loss of trust which led to the turmoil in Kashmir following the arrest and dismissal of the Sheikh in 1953. This damage was repaired 22 years later by Indira Gandhi. Sheikh Abdullah was able to explain to his people, as only he could, on his triumphal return to the state in 1975, the background in which he agreed to sign the accord with the government of India. While there were voices of dissent, they were so feeble that hardly anyone took notice of them.
The people of Kashmir, after a long period of time, enjoyed the fruits of democracy under Sheikh Abdullah. The government, in an innovative step, started holding development meetings of the cabinet in different districts in an attempt to take governance to the grassroots. The Sheikh’s bottom line to his colleagues and officers was that nobody’s right should be unjustly snatched away, be it a Muslim’s, Hindu’s, Sikh’s or Christian’s. Even at an advanced age, Sheikh Abdullah could easily communicate with his people, and he never shied away from going to the people in every crisis. His people, in turn, gave him their unstinted love and support. The Sheikh spent almost all of his time within the state, focussing only on the developments in Kashmir. Syed Ali Shah Geelani and his Jamaat-e-Islami were confined to small and insignificant pockets when the Sheikh was in charge. When Sheikh Abdullah’s health took a turn for the worse, the whole of Kashmir prayed for his recovery. When the Sheikh finally breathed his last and his body was kept for the public to pay respects, hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris passed by the body, weeping and beating their breasts.
The trust and the goodwill that the people of Kashmir had for the Sheikh passed on to his son, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the Sheikh’s anointed successor, who had taken over as the new Chief Minister. The Congress party, led by Indira Gandhi, which was ruling at the centre, backed Farooq Abdullah’s taking over as the Chief Minister. The Kashmiris wanted their leader to stand up for their rights, especially in relation to the government of India, in view of the earlier background of the treatment meted out to Sheikh Abdullah. Assembly elections were due and held in June 1983. The Congress party wanted an electoral understanding with the National Conference, which did not work out. This led to a bitter parting of ways and bitterly contested elections with communal undertones. Farooq Abdullah led the National Conference to victory, and promptly joined the opposition bandwagon with their regular conclaves in different cities of India, including Srinagar. Those were the heady days when the opposition was led by the charismatic N. T. Rama Rao. Hardly anyone noticed the fact that by this one move, Farooq Abdullah had mainstreamed political Kashmir with political India (Abdullah 1985: 62). He had arrived on the national scene, which his venerable father had studiously avoided. If only this positive development had been allowed to grow to its full potential!
B. K. Nehru, related to Indira Gandhi, had taken over as the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir from L. K. Jha in 1981. Finding Nehru not amenable to dealing with the recalcitrant Farooq Abdullah, the Governor was replaced by Jagmohan though Nehru’s term was yet to be completed. Taking advantage of a split in the Abdullah family, Sheikh Abdullah’s unpopular son-in-law, G. M. Shah, was propped up by the Congress after winning over a dozen National Conference legislators, and in about a year after the 1983 elections, Dr. Farooq Abdullah was unseated from power. For the centre led by the Congress, Farooq Abdullah had become a security risk by joining with the opposition! One of the charges allegedly made by the Congress against Farooq was that he recruited Sikh extremists, Muslim secessionists and known Pakistan agents into the Jammu and Kashmir police (Abdullah 1985: 42). This writer was the chairman of the police recruitment board from May 1980 to June, 1983. Not once did Sheikh Abdullah, who was the Chief Minister during this period from May 1980 till September 1982 when he passed away, or any one close from his circle, or Farooq Abdullah ever try to reach this writer to influence police recruitment. On the other hand, for the first time, the recruitment board visited every district and tehsil of the state, and based on the 1971 census figures of the government of India and the merit of the candidates, gave proportionate representation in the police to every community. Farooq Abdullah’s popularity in Kashmir soared even higher for standing up to the centre, though the people had to put up with the unpopular administration of G. M. Shah for a couple of years.
These unfortunate developments were taking place in this sensitive, frontline state contiguous with Pakistan at a time when the Inter-Services Intelligence – Central Intelligence Agency (ISI-CIA) inspired jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was at its peak, and Zia ul-Haq was planning to extend the jihad into Kashmir with the connivance of the Jamaat-e-Islaami of Pakistan and Kashmir. Pakistani academics have written about the plans drawn by the ISI under Zia’s instructions in 1984 to destabilise and take over Kashmir from India, which were to mature in 1991 (Hussain 2005: 273). Farooq Abdullah, however, was not made in the same mould as his father, and in about two years after his dismissal, was willing to compromise and come to an understanding with Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress to get back to power. By then, the Congress had grown tired of G. M. Shah, and brought back Farooq Abdullah to power after a few months of Governor’s rule. The anti-national Farooq Abdullah once again became a nationalist for the Congress party. The politically highly conscious Kashmiri was not fooled by this. While his heart still beat for the beloved National Conference, Farooq Abdullah had lost his special place in the Kashmiri’s heart after his compromise with the centre.
In the ensuing elections, the Jamaat-e-Islami led conglomerate of opposition parties under the name of Muslim United Front (MUF) fought against the vastly more popular National Conference. The Kashmiri had not yet lost faith in Indian democracy. There was alleged rigging in some constituencies which in public perception the MUF candidates should have won. The most famous of these constituencies was the one contested by the MUF’s Yusuf Shah, whose agent was Yasin Malik. After the results were announced, these leaders were allegedly ill-treated by the police (Sharma 2008). The net result was once again the loss of trust of the Kashmiri in the Indian system. This drove the young political leaders into the arms of the ISI (Hussain 2005: 273). Yusuf Shah became Salahuddin, the chief of the United Jihad Council based in Pakistan. Yasin Malik, chief of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), after a failed armed struggle against the Indian security forces, accepted the peaceful path for resolution of the Kashmir problem. Following the start of the Kashmiri insurgency, actively assisted by the ISI through training and supply of arms, the dispute in Kashmir got once again revived and merged with the dispute of Kashmir!
Ever since the dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1953, the establishment in Delhi has shown a mistrust of the Kashmiri. While there were elements in Delhi to poison the ears of Nehru against Abdullah, there were also elements in the Valley to create misunderstandings between the two, creating grave misgivings in the mind of the Sheikh. The management of Kashmir from Delhi started with this loss of trust in the Kashmiri, forgetting that it was the trust between the most important Kashmiri leader and Nehru, and the former’s faith in democracy and secularism that strengthened India’s case to keep Kashmir. This loss of trust in the Kashmiri became most visible when the insurgency started, and the Kashmir police was kept out of the counter-insurgency grid from 1990 to early 1992.
The Kashmir police worked with utmost loyalty to the government in power, throughout the period that the Sheikh was out of power. The police worked with the same enthusiasm when the Sheikh returned to power. The police were loyal when Farooq Abdullah took over the reins of the government, and when he was deposed and his brother-in-law was made Chief Minister. When militancy arrived on the scene, the police, though ill trained and ill armed, were in the forefront in seizing AK-47s and arresting militant leaders. It was the police which developed information from the nomadic Gujjars and foiled their attempts to create trouble in the valley when Pakistani agents tried to infiltrate into the valley in 1965, in advance of the Pakistani army’s adventure to get Kashmir. It was the police which destroyed the al Fatah movement in early 1970s, arrested Maqbool Bhat for murder and got him convicted and sentenced to death. The militants’ first targeted attack was on the local Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), at his house, which was foiled by the police. But when the police and members of their family continued to get targeted and killed, and, in the wake of the Rubaiya Sayeed abduction in December, 1989 following which five JKLF militants arrested by the police were released, the police forces became demoralised. It was a failure of the government in general, and the police leadership in particular, that led to this state of affairs.
Farooq Abdullah resigned when a new Governor, the controversial Jagmohan, was appointed. The new Governor promptly dissolved the assembly. Ill advised action by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Srinagar on the eve of the new Governor’s taking over, in which several youth were allegedly killed, led to protests and exodus of Muslim youth to Pakistan occupied Kashmir for arms training to fight against perceived injustices. The JKLF targeted Kashmiri Pandit leaders like Tikalal Taploo, the state vice president of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Neelkanth Ganju, a retired judge who had sentenced Maqbool Bhat to death and others, followed by calls of azadi, which led to a Pandit exodus from the valley to Jammu and other parts of India.
The police are the backbone of any administration in a crisis. But strangely, the entire top leadership of Jammu and Kashmir police was taken out from the field in the valley at this critical juncture. The new Director General of Police (DG) and his chief assistants were brought from outside the cadre. For a while, of the three range DIGs in the Kashmir valley, two were from outside the cadre. The rank and file of the police was out of action as it was not trusted - the usual taunt was that they were Pakistanis - a most unkind taunt given the history of loyalty and sacrifice of the local police throughout the turmoil from 1947. There were a few elements which were mixed up with the militancy, but the overwhelming majority was clean, though reluctant to act against militants because of poor leadership, and the threat to their families. It was the army, and the paramilitary forces, consisting of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the CRPF which were fighting the militants. No counterinsurgency action can be successful unless the local police are involved. Yet it took some years and deaths of hundreds of innocent youth along with militants, beside allegations of human rights violations in international forums, for the realization to dawn on the government of India that there was need to involve the local police in the fight against militancy inspired from across the border.
Pakistan injected foreign jihadis along with Pakistani militants into Kashmir, after finding the resolve of the locals to fight the security forces dissolving. Before that, Pakistan made the independence seeking JKLF ineffective by stopping supply of money and arms to them, and encouraging the Hizbul Mujahideen, the armed wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami to eliminate the JKLF in fratricidal wars. With Pakistani patronage, a separatist conglomerate, consisting of 26 political, social and religious organizations called the Hurriyat Conference was set up on 9 March 1993, for a political face. Syed Ali Shah Jeelani of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a known Pakistani supporter and Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, the young son of the assassinated Miwaiz Muhammad Farooq (Kashmir’s chief priest who was killed by gunmen of the Hizbul Mujahideen in May 1990 finding him going soft on India) were the star leaders.
In the meanwhile, in Kashmir, the local police was encouraged to join the fight by bringing in cadre officers to lead them. In a no holds barred unconventional war with hard core Afghan trained jihadis let loose by Pakistan on the hapless Kashmiris, the Indian security forces started to gain the upper hand. There was no major operation in Jammu and Kashmir from then onwards without the participation or input of the local police; they had become the spearhead of the counterinsurgency strategy by then. Thousands of sophisticated arms, including AK-47s, Pika guns, UMGs, LMGs, RPGs and their ammunition, and tons of grenades and explosives - enough to arm several divisions of a regular army, were seized and recovered by the security forces from the jihadis. The Pakistanis resorted to the fearsome fidayeen attacks, or suicide attacks. After the initial element of surprise, even this proved ineffective against the Indian security forces.
In 1996, a popular government under Farooq Abdullah took office, after a gap of six years. Tourism, the mainstay of Kashmir’s economy, started to revive. But in 1999, in spite of the political leaderships of India and Pakistan wanting to talk peace, Kargil happened, a misadventure by the Pakistan army led by its chief, General Musharraf. The years 2000 and 2001 were particularly difficult, with intensified jihadi action against the Indian security forces, the highlight being the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in October 2001 followed by an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. India mobilized its forces on the Pakistan border following the parliament attack, but things abated soon after international intervention. Back channel talks soon commenced between India and Pakistan, followed by relative peace in Kashmir.
Elections to the Assembly in 2002 threw surprises, with Omar Abdullah, scion of the Abdullah dynasty losing the family’s stronghold of Ganderbal to an unknown candidate. The Kashmiri realised, once again, the power of the ballot in a free electoral process. A positive development during the unfortunate happenings in the valley was the movement of young Kashmiris to different parts of India seeking higher education. Till then, they had been reluctant to go out of the valley. These youngsters were able to enjoy the full fruits of India’s liberal democracy while pursuing their studies in different education centres, and also watched the India growth story on the world stage.
The new coalition government of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) and the Congress, led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, started on a positive note. The new government tried to reach out to the people, to ease the pain of the common man (almost every one having lost a near and dear one in the conflict) through its ‘healing touch’ policy. Pakistan also realised the futility of its strategy to drive India out of Kashmir through force, and talks were progressing through back channels between the two countries for a peaceful solution to the issue. Militancy was at an all-time low, and tourism had picked up. In 2005, the Srinagar-Muzafarabad road was opened for intra-Kashmiri travel, an electoral promise made by the PDP. Trade between the two parts of Kashmir followed on a limited scale. It was around this time that General Musharraf got bogged down by internal problems. Musharraf’s ouster and the installation of the new government in Pakistan were followed by the Mumbai terror attacks popularly called India’s 26/11, stalling the talks between the two countries.
In the meanwhile, problems were created in Kashmir in 2008 by the Amarnath Shrine Board’s land acquisition in the valley which led to a flare up in the valley followed by serious law and order problems in Jammu, including blocking the national highway to ‘teach’ the Kashmiris a lesson. The annual Amarnath Yatra to the holy cave in the higher reaches of the valley, to witness the ice lingam has been going on for decades. Pilgrims from all over the country flock to the cave for the annual Yatra. After the onset of militancy, the Yatra period, which was two to three weeks initially, became a period of stress for the security forces. The Governor, Lt. General (Retd.) S. K. Sinha, as Chairman of the Shrine Board, enhanced the period of the Yatra to two months over serious objections raised by the state government and environmentalists. In 2008, the government allotted about 44 hectares of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board for use of the pilgrims. This step of the government was exploited by some vested interests and separatist groups, in order to whip up emotions of the people, as one that would allow outsiders to come and settle in the valley, thereby changing its demographic character. This led to widespread protests in the valley, and reactions to them in the Jammu province. The national highway was blocked leading to serious shortages of essential items, including medicines to the people of the valley. The emotional trauma that this caused the Kashmiri was hardly taken into account. Nevertheless, in the assembly elections that followed, Kashmiris voted in strength, and brought in a change of government. Omar Abdullah took over the reins of government amid new hope that the Kashmir problem would be solved. The separatists had taken a back seat before the Amarnath controversy, but were allowed to come to the fore by the government’s actions. The peoples’ response to the elections was yet another blow to the separatists. This would clearly show that the common man had an independent approach and the separatists could not influence his mind every time. Unfortunately, Indian policy makers fail to take note of these subtle nuances. The year 2010 saw yet another flare up, when three innocent Kashmiris were shot dead on the border, calling them infiltrating terrorists. This was an army action. Once it was established that the persons killed were innocent villagers, the valley erupted in spontaneous protests. The police and paramilitary forces were still in the anti-militancy mode, armed with SLRs and AK-47s rather than lathies and tear smoke, more suited for law and order action. In about three months, more than a hundred youth were killed in police firing. This reflected a clear lack of direction and preparation on the law and order front. The insensitive handling of the situation led to the initiative going yet again into the hands of the separatists.
It is relevant here to look at the conflict in Kashmir (which we call internal dimension of the conflict) and the conflict of Kashmir (which we refer to as the external dimension of the conflict) and deal with each separately. Two Indian Prime Ministers have, at two different times, broadly laid down the limits the Indian state was prepared to go to, in search for an acceptable solution for the Kashmir problem. Addressing the people of Kashmir from far away Burkina Faso in 1995 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said that the ‘sky was the limit’ in regard to autonomy that could be worked out for Jammu and Kashmir. This could be the parameter to once and for all settle the conflict in Kashmir, essentially with its people. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was addressing Pakistan when he said during a visit to the valley, that there cannot be any redrawing of boundaries, or a further division of India on communal lines, in an attempt to solve the Kashmir problem. Pakistan has tried every means at its disposal to destabilise Kashmir and snatch it from India. Regular wars and asymmetrical war using jihadis have been tried by Pakistan, resulting in death and destruction in Kashmir, but without any success. While India is growing economically stronger by the day, with growing clout in international forums, Pakistan is fighting for its very survival today. Once the internal conflict in Kashmir is settled, dialogue with Pakistan could be confidently held to reach a settlement within the parameters set by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The question is how to finally settle the conflict in Kashmir.
This is where the question of trust looms large. The Kashmiris, under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership, placed their trust in India to preserve their unique culture of tolerance and religious harmony and for their social and economic development. They trusted and believed in the ideals enshrined in the Indian Constitution. But has New Delhi trusted the Kashmiris to run their affairs as had initially been agreed to when creating Constitutional safeguards for them? The history of the relations between New Delhi and Kashmir from 1953 onwards would show how the trust deficit has developed between the two. India’s liberal democracy has shown tremendous resilience and strength in overcoming any number of social, communal and ethnic issues over the last sixty years. New Delhi has the inherent strength to give back to the Kashmiris the trust they placed in it, in equal measure. The Indian security establishment has proved to the world, and especially Pakistan, that they can tackle any threat against India. Within the parameters set by the two Indian Prime Ministers mentioned above, it should be possible to first of all talk to the Kashmiris, especially the educated youngsters, and convince them of New Delhi’s sincerity to address their issues, even if it be autonomy that they seek to run their affairs. The educated youngsters have more at stake, and if the picture was seen closely, there are several positive signs that indicate their choice of India over Pakistan or other alternatives. One significant development is Kashmiri Muslims wanting to join the Indian Civil Service. As early as 1994, Kashmiri Muslims have successfully got into the Indian Police Service through the civil services examination, when militancy was at its height, and have done exceptionally well wherever they have served, be it in the valley or elsewhere. The topper in a recent civil service examination was a Kashmiri Muslim doctor. Many more have qualified for allied services. Highly qualified Kashmiri Muslim youngsters are working in different spheres in Kashmir itself and in different parts of India. Whenever there are negative developments in Kashmir, it is but natural that these youngsters would get affected. But they have seen India’s liberal democracy at its best in the rest of India, and would expect to have a similar liberal environment in their Kashmir. Has an attempt been made to address this constituency? Rahul Gandhi has been visiting colleges in different parts of India, and meeting young students, making an impact on their young minds. Why can’t Rahul Gandhi, or other young leaders address students in Kashmir University, and convince them about New Delhi’s deep concern for their welfare? Indeed they will have to face some difficult questions, but should be able to provide answers.
The Hurriyat Conference was promoted by the Pakistanis as a political face of the insurgents, for questioning India’s sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. In the context of the international community frowning on terrorism and violence, this was an ideal platform for Pakistan to promote the cause of secession of Jammu and Kashmir. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) has been claiming that they were the sole representatives of the Kashmiri people, and this was readily accepted by Pakistan, though the government of India has ignored their claim. The Hurriyat has boycotted all the elections that were held in the state since their formation. Their main activity so far has been to criticise the security forces for alleged violation of human rights, and disrupt normal life by frequent calls for shut downs. They regularly give calls for hartals on every Independence Day, Republic Day, and 28 October, the day on which the Indian army landed in Srinagar in response to the call for assistance from the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir (following the signing of the instrument of accession in the wake of the attacks by Pakistani raiders on Kashmir in October 1948).
The Hurriyat split into two in 2002, following participation in elections by some candidates known to be close to some of its constituents. The two factions are led by the hard line and pro-Pakistan Syed Ali Shah Geelani and the moderate Mirwaiz Omar Farooq respectively. The moderate faction entered into talks with the central government, and visited Pakistan to meet with Pakistani leaders as well as militant leaders there. They held two rounds of talks with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2004, and two more rounds with the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, but the talks did not go far. The other faction led by Geelani was not willing for talks, wanting India to declare Kashmir as a disputed territory. According to Geelani’s faction, Kashmir is a religious issue, and Kashmir has to become part of Pakistan. According to the other faction, Kashmir is a political issue.
The two Hurriyat factions became ineffective as militancy came down in the state, and Track II talks between the emissaries of India and Pakistan began to make substantial progress. A ceasefire along the border further brought down the level of violence, and people began to enjoy peace. The Srinagar - Muzaffarabad bus service, and the trade between the two Kashmirs further boosted the chances of peace, but all this came to naught after the ouster of President Musharraf. While there are little chances of the Geelani faction coming for talks, the moderate faction members have gradually started coming out openly in favour of negotiations. Sajjad Lone, son of the assassinated leader of the Peoples’ Conference, Abdul Gani Lone, came out of the Hurriyat, and contested the Lok Sabha election from the Baramulla constituency. Though he lost the election to a National Conference candidate, he made a clear statement that there are elements within the ‘separatists’ who have seen the writing on the wall - that violence and separatism will not go far. More recently, another leader from the moderate Hurriyat camp, Professor Abdul Gani Bhat, stated that leaders like Mirwaiz Farooq and Abdul Gani Lone were killed by militants, and not the security forces. The government should once again explore possibilities of getting these leaders to participate in talks.
A large number of youngsters had crossed over to Pakistan for arms training. Some of them have returned to India, crossing the border at great risk to their lives and surrendered to the police. A number of them have returned via Nepal and surrendered to the police (Bukhari 2010). A large number of the remaining has expressed readiness to return and resume normal life. The families of such youngsters have been pressing the state government to allow their misguided sons to get back home. The government will have to think about this matter and take a quick decision. Both the state and the central governments are seized of this problem. It may be recalled that the NDA government under Vajpayee had entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Hizbul Mujahideen in mid-2000, and had entered into talks with the group, though the talks were sabotaged by Pakistan (Vinayak 2000). Had the talks proceeded on more successful lines, the government would have had to make arrangements for getting the misguided youth who had gone to Pakistan back into the mainstream at that point of time itself. For the Indian government, the Hizbul Mujahideen joining the mainstream would have meant the end of the insurgency.
For the common man in Kashmir, the return of his son to a peaceful life will be a big boon. This one step will also neutralise the Hizbul Mujahideen, the indigenous militant group, whose chief, Mohammad Yousuf Shah @ Syed Salahuddin, is the chief of the Pakistan based United Jihad Council. The fact that these youngsters know nothing except militant related activities will have to be carefully calibrated into any policy for their rehabilitation. A large number of militants who had earlier surrendered to the government have been absorbed in the police and paramilitary forces after rigorous verification and training. The government may not be able to accommodate all the remaining in services. Some other means of livelihood will have to be worked out for these youngsters, after giving them some form of vocational training. The police will have to update their records pertaining to these youngsters, and keep them under watch for some time to prevent them getting involved in undesirable activities. In fact, the responsibility of the local police would increase manifold in such a scenario, as a huge quantity of arms and explosives have entered Kashmir from across the border. Though the security forces have seized a large number of arms and tons of explosives, there still would be substantial quantity in unauthorised hands. The return of trained youngsters, still angry with themselves for wasting their lives, and finding other young Kashmiri men and women, better educated than themselves doing extremely well in life, with arms and explosives floating around could spell trouble for any state. Incidence of crime can increase steeply. In view of such possibilities, it is necessary that the state, and especially the police, plan in advance, to tackle them.
The Prime Minister had set up five working groups to look at different aspects of the Kashmir problem, following round table conferences in Srinagar and Delhi. No follow up action has been taken on any of the political aspects of the issue. The government has set up other committees to look at economic and job creation issues, but unless the political aspects are looked into, there can be no lasting solution to the problem. The mainstream parties, the National Conference and the Peoples’ Democratic Party, have laid down their positions in well-reasoned documents on autonomy and self-rule respectively. Even a separatist leader, Sajjad Lone, son of the assassinated Abdul Gani Lone, who broke ranks with the Hurriyat and contested the 2009 Lok Sabha election from Baramulla constituency, has brought out a document entitled Achievable Nationhood. There is a need to look at these proposals seriously, and talk with the leaders and convince them about how much accommodation can be made by the government of India to include their proposals in a final deal on Kashmir. The Hurriyat and other separatists who are not willing to talk within the parameters set by the Prime Minister should be simply ignored. They do not have much voice in Kashmir, except to disrupt normal life, exploiting emotive issues. If law and order and other sensitive issues are handled prudently, the separatists can be denied any say in Kashmir.
In brief, the trust between Kashmir and Delhi that got damaged in the last nearly sixty years needs to be restored. The Kashmiris have to be trusted. It is necessary to talk to their leaders and especially the youth, and bring them round. They have to be given back their sense of pride and dignity which have been badly affected. It is necessary to explain to them why the army, the paramilitary and the police force have to be extensively deployed to check the proxy war thrust on India by the Pakistanis, and that this will have to continue till Pakistan dismantles the terrorist infrastructure they have set up against India. Sheikh Abdullah would have explained such measures to his people in a language that they understood and appreciated. It is necessary to ensure that the security forces are more sensitive in their handling of the common people. The local police and the CRPF will have to be re-oriented through suitable training to the changed context in which they are working, without indeed, lowering their guard. They have to treat the people with care and due consideration. For this, the local special branch intelligence gathering will have to be strengthened, with the posting and training of the most suitable officers and men. All this is difficult, but necessary if we are to move ahead in Kashmir.
The conflict in Kashmir needs to be resolved. Building trust in the people of Kashmir is the only way forward. For this to happen, India’s leading political parties have to come on the same page, leaving competitive politics out of Kashmir. The BJP, which upped the ante with its Ekta Yatra on the eve of Republic Day 2011, would do well to remember its statesman Vajpayee, when, as Prime Minister he gave a call to resolve Kashmir within the framework of Insaniyat.
Seminar paper - Alphonsa College, Palai
