Watch over Pakistan proxies

By Radhavinod Raju

Several Pakistani strategists believed that they were holding all the cards in the closing stages of the Afghan end game. With Mullah Omar and his Shura safely ensconced in Quetta, the Haqqanis ready to do any bidding to strike at NATO and Afghan security forces, and the NATO dependent on Pakistan for refurbishing essential supplies for the Afghan operations, Pakistan expected to gain a place on the high table to discuss Afghanistan’s future as NATO and US forces wound down their operations. Pakistan’s obsession with having strategic depth in Afghanistan, and its opposition to growing Indian influence in that country have guided the Pakistan Army’s strategic thinkers in making their policy on Afghanistan.

The May 2 Abbottabad operation, when US Navy SEALs swooped down on Osama bin Laden’s hideout at a short distance from the Pakistan Army’s prestigious Academy in Kakul, changed all that. It left the army, the self-proclaimed defender of Pakistan’s sovereignty and integrity, red-faced. President Obama’s announcement to the world about the end of Osama, and that the United States had gone it alone gave indication that the Americans did not trust their ‘strategic ally’ in the war on terror on this sensitive operation. His announcement a few days later in London, that the US would not hesitate to repeat the operation were they to get information about a high value target, only rubbed salt into the Pakistani wounds.

Officials in Pentagon were clear that Pakistan cannot be trusted with sensitive operational information. They cited earlier instances when they shared operational information with Pakistani authorities, closely followed by the ISI passing on such sensitive information to militants allowing them to escape before commencement of operations. The Americans had access to technology and other sources to verify such actions of the ISI. They even believed that the ISI was orchestrating public and media opinion in the country to attack Americans, though US aid and assistance were always welcomed. The Qaeda attack on the Mehran Naval Base in Karachi around this time gave clear indications that Qaeda elements had infiltrated some elements of Pakistan’s armed forces. Salim Shahzad, the Pakistani journalist who had reported on such nexus, was abducted and his decapitated body was discovered a few days later, allegedly by the ISI. All US attempts to make Pakistan agree to dismantling the Haqqani network in North Waziristan failed.

It was in the midst of such deteriorating atmospherics between the United States and Pakistan that the November NATO airborne attack on two Pakistani Army posts took place in Salala, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. According to the Pakistan Army this was an unprovoked attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty. There was furore all over the country, with the government demanding an apology from the Americans. They refused to participate in a joint enquiry by NATO. Immediate action taken by the Pakistanis included closure of the NATO supply line through Karachi to the Afghan border, the cheapest and shortest route that the supplies could take, and closure of the Shamsi airbase from where some of the drone attacks used to be mounted by the CIA to target militants in Pakistani bad-lands in North Waziristan. There was competition between the army and the civilian government to show who took the tougher stand vis-à-vis the Americans, forgetting for a moment the dependence of both on US aid and assistance. Pakistani attempts to replace America with China as their principal benefactor only produced lukewarm response from the all-weather friend. Instead of looking for opportunities to reduce the diplomatic temperature between the two countries, Pakistan decided to boycott the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2011, closing the gate for a possible reconciliation between the estranged allies.

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani referred the whole issue for a parliamentary review, and got clearance to open the NATO supply lines, stoppage of drone attacks and re-negotiation of transit fee for NATO’s supplies. Pakistan did not get an invite for the NATO’s conference in Chicago that was to discuss Afghanistan. Karzai was, on the other hand, an important guest. Though the Pakistani Army kept aloof, Zardari wangled an invite at the last moment, hoping to make up with the Americans. The supply route did not open as Pakistanis demanded a hike in the transit fees. President Obama refused to meet Zardari and he finally returned empty handed from Chicago, with foreign minister Rabbani Khar harping on a US apology that had no chance of coming forth. The recent punishment meted out to Shakil Afridi by a tribal court, sentencing him to 33 years imprisonment for helping the CIA to locate the world’s most wanted terrorist has further exacerbated US-Pakistan relations. For the US, Afridi is a hero, while Pakistan calls him a traitor. While the US would be happy if Pakistan gave wholehearted cooperation to their winding down operations and future Afghan strategy, they have taken other measures to shift their forces and supplies through the central Asian regions. Pakistan now finds itself in a corner vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

The US would like India to play a more active role in Afghanistan. India has entered into a strategic partnership with that country and has already invested billions in Afghanistan’s development. Indian public and private sector companies have won rights to develop iron ore mines in Haji Gak, and they are in the process of investing billions more to develop railways and power plants in the area. India has deep cultural and other roots in Afghanistan, and except for a brief period of Taliban rule, has always had excellent relations with that country. Afghanistan is India’s gateway to Central Asian gas and oil. India’s partnership with Afghanistan provides for training of its armed forces and police.

Pakistan is not happy with these developments, notwithstanding several rounds of bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan. The only way the Pakistan Army and the ISI know of forcing their way in Afghanistan is by causing death and destruction through terror attacks. To keep India away from Afghanistan, the ISI would look at creating more trouble in India. Tourism is booming once again in Kashmir and we need to keep a close watch over militant and separatist activities. Our forces should be on the alert for sudden provocations from across the border. The NIA, the Intelligence Bureau and the state anti-terrorist units need to keep a sharp look-out over Pakistan’s proxies here, the Indian Mujahideen for sudden strikes in sensitive centres.

Radhavinod Raju  is a former director general of the National Investigation Agency.

New Indian Express

16th June 2012