Disputes in fighting terror

By Radhavinod Raju

The central government’s order on the constitution of the NCTC has run into rough weather, with not only opposition-run state governments, but even governments run by its own ally openly criticising the order for allegedly violating the seventh schedule of the Constitution — infringing on the states’ area of responsibility, and calling for its review and eventual withdrawal. Terrorists today draw plans to attack India choosing targets at different centres, with Mumbai and Delhi figuring prominently on the radar, but also encompassing iconic targets like the Indian Institute of Science. Apart from Delhi and Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Surat, Jaipur, Lucknow, Guwahati, Hyderabad and Chennai have all been attacked by jihadi groups at different times. The Lashkar-e-Toiba’s multiple Mumbai attacks on 26/11 are considered the most devastating after the 9/11 terror attacks.

Syed Saleem Shahzad, the murdered Pakistani journalist known for his deep contacts with the jihadists has said in his book Inside Al Qaeda And The Taliban that 26/11 was executed by al-Qaeda. The recent attack on an Israeli diplomat has allegedly brought the Iran-Israeli cold war to our capital. This case is yet to be worked out, and international agencies will be keenly watching out findings in the case. Can the states by themselves handle jihadi terror? What happens when terrorists plan an attack sitting in a foreign country, and lodge simultaneous attacks across several cities in India? What is the Centre’s role in tackling terrorists who have made India their target?

The type of asymmetric war that was unleashed against India by a hostile neighbour, with terror as an instrument of state policy, would never have figured in the reckoning of our leaders while the Constitution was being drafted. Had this figured then, police would have most certainly gone into the concurrent list, instead of the states’ list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. While the Constitution has provided for the Centre protecting states from external aggression and internal disturbance, what happens when the country which has covertly encouraged jihad against India, overtly professes friendship? How does the Centre discharge its responsibility of protecting the states against the jihadists, short of going to war?

It is obvious therefore that the central and state governments have to work in close coordination to thwart terrorist attacks against India. There has to be an agency in India which has an all India picture of the threats to this country, and this agency has to work closely with the state police forces, both the intelligence agencies and the operational units, in order to neutralise the threats, and to take action, if and when the threat is converted into an attack on the ground. The Union home minister’s plan, that was unveiled during the IB Centennial Endowment lecture in December 2009, had provided for such ingredients consisting of preventive, detective and operational units. P Chidambaram, however, had foreseen turf wars between different agencies and had pleaded that such turf wars should be avoided. However, the final shape of the order creating the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) has belied such hopes.

The minister had said that the IB’s Multi Agency Centre (MAC) would be subsumed into the NCTC, along with several other agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA). It appears to have been already forgotten that the NIA was created in the backdrop of the 26/11 attacks to fight terror, and it had not only detective, but also preventive mandates in regard to terrorist attacks. The NIA has taken up only one case of a major terrorist attack after its formation — there appears to be reluctance in the Ministry of Home Affairs to direct the NIA to take up all major terrorist cases that have taken place after 26/11. On the other hand, it has been burdened with old cases, both of the jihadi variety and right-wing terror that had taken place much before its creation. In this set-up, how does one expect a new agency to concentrate all its energies in fighting jihadi terror for which it was apparently created in the first place?

But the most important question is why Section 43 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) has been used to give powers of arrest, searches and seizure to the Intelligence Bureau, something which is totally unprecedented? Was this necessary? The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has police powers of arrest, search and seizure, but it can function in the states only with the consent of the state governments. There is unfortunately, a public perception, perhaps well-founded, that the CBI is the handmaiden of the ruling party at the Centre, and can be misused. That is why no state would have accepted the CBI being given powers to take up terrorist cases, like the NIA, without the states’ consent. The states’ consent is in-built in the structure of the Delhi Police Establishment Act, the Act from which the CBI draws its powers. Similarly, there is a strong perception that the IB works to promote the political interests of the ruling party at the Centre. As long as this perception persists in the states, they will not accept extension of police powers to the IB.

But once again, was it necessary to give the IB these powers? The NIA already has these powers of arrest, searches and seizures, and an inspector general in the NIA has already been declared as the designated authority under the UAPA. No state government has objected to this. Why can’t the IB and the NIA work closely, in close coordination with the states, and fight terror? So, if, as the Union home minister had originally envisaged, the NIA had also been brought in the overall scheme, there was no need for this order, and this needless controversy could have been avoided. Is the NIA only an investigation agency? And if the latest terrorist cases will not be given to it, is its role only to investigate dead cases? Where does it stand in the latest scheme of the government?

(Views expressed in the column are the author’s own) 

Radhavinod Raju is a former director general of the National Investigation Agency. E-mail: radhavinodraju@gmail.com 

New Indian Express