Preventing Terror Attacks
Role of Human and Technical Intelligence in India
A study of terrorist attacks would show that a lot of
in-depth planning goes into each major attack.
Selection of the target in each case would be
based on the needs and objectives of the terrorist
organization. Then there is the selection of the
operatives who would carry out the attack, the
modus operandi, the explosive device or the type
of weapons to be used in the attack, information
required about the target, its accessibility, security
of the target, training and motivation of the
operatives required to carry out the attack
successfully, planting the operatives in the vicinity
of the target to make use of the opportunity,
whether they can rely on local support, and so on.
In this connection, the assassination of former
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a human bomb,
Mumbai serial terror attacks of March 1993, former
Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh’s assassination,
attack on the Indian Parliament, serial attacks on
Mumbai trains in July, 2006 and the 26/11 Mumbai
terrorist attacks of November, 2008, readily come
to mind. Of these major attacks, this essay
examines the manner in which the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination and the 26/11 attacks were planned
and carried out by the LTTE and the Lashkar-eTayeba (LeT)
respectively.
I
THE RAJIV GANDHI ASSASSINATION CASE
Once the LTTE decided to eliminate Rajiv Gandhi
to achieve their organizational goals, they had to
choose the operative, select the venue, and plan
the deed and so on. In June 1990, they had
assassinated the EPRLF leader, Padmanabha and
12 others in the heart of Chennai. Unfortunately,
this case was not worked out. Investigations later
established that this was an operation carried out
by the intelligence wing of the LTTE. The LTTE got
emboldened by the success of this operation in
Chennai, and that it had not been worked out by
the police. By mid-1990, the LTTE, which had kept a
tab on the latest political developments in India ,
knew general elections were in the offing, and that
Rajiv Gandhi will visit Chennai for electioneering.
That was the occasion they chose for the
operation to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. They could
not have gone with guns and grenades to the
venue like they did in the Padmanabha case, as a
large posse of armed policemen would be on duty
for a function to be attended by Rajiv Gandhi.
It is believed the LTTE intelligence chief Pottu
with the plan of the human bomb to solve the
problem of getting close to the target. A woman
admirer can try and get access to a VIP to wish
and garland him at a meeting site. That was the
plan finally chosen by the LTTE to get access to
Rajiv Gandhi-the operative would carry an
improvised explosive device on the body, and
detonate the device while in the close vicinity of
the target, eliminating the target, the human
bomb itself and anyone else in the killing radius.
This is precisely what the LTTE’s Dhanu (believed to
be Kalaivani, the daughter of a Tamil Nationalist
leader of Jaffna ,
Rajaratnam) carried out at
Sriperumbudur. Two of the LTTE operatives used in
the Padmanabhaoperation, Raghuvaran(actual
name Pakkiachandran) and Santhan (actual
name Suthenthiraraja) were selected by the LTTE
for the Rajiv Gandhi operation.
As it was not a hit and run operation, the
operational squad had to have a base in or near
Chennai where they could camp and wait for the
opportunity. For this purpose the LTTE had to set up
hide-outs in Tamil Nadu for their intelligence wing.
The LTTE already had a major set up in Tamil Nadu
to look after their supply, media and treatment for
injured cadre wings, called the political group.
They had local support too.
Yet, the LTTE decided to keep out this set up from
the operation to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi
probably because they were aware that this set
up was known intimately to the Indian intelligence
agencies. They got in touch with a close Indian
supporter of the LTTE based in Chennai called
Muthuraja in December, 1990, and asked him to
introduce his friends to the intelligence wing
operative who had been sent to Chennai. They
further instructed Muthuraja, who was closely
involved with the LTTE’s Chennai based political
set up, not to disclose the intelligence wing
operation matter to anyone. Muthuraja
introduced his friends, Bhagyanathan, Arivu and
Haribabu to the LTTE’s intelligence wing operative,
Murugan. This is how Murugan, accused in the
Rajiv Gandhi assassination case and facing death
sentence, came to stay with Bhagyanathanin their
house in Chennai, and gradually got close to his
sister Nalini.
The mastermind of this operation was
Raghuvaran, Murugan’s boss. He brought Dhanu,
who was to become the human bomb and Subha
with him. But they had to stay close to Chennai,
where Rajiv Gandhi was expected during
electioneering, so that they can get access to
him. They therefore needed a base for themselves
in Chennai.
How did this terrorist squad enter India ? In June,
1990, the LTTE-Sri Lanka Eelam War II had started,
and a large number of refugees had poured into
Tamil Nadu through the Coast. They had to
register themselves as refugees at the coastal
entry points. These records were available to the
intelligence agencies. None of the LTTE’s
intelligence wing operatives would register
themselves as refugees. By this one move, they
escaped the eye of the Indian intelligence
agencies. They arrived from Jaffna in high speed
fiber glass boats at pre-arranged locations on the
Tamil Nadu coast, and took assistance of friendly
smugglers to get into the hinterland.
Raghuvaran, who was one-eyed, had assumed a
new operational name, Sivarasan, for the Rajiv
Gandhi operation. He set up two secret hide-outs
for himself and for Subha and Dhanu, by sending
two families from Jaffna
with strong ties to the LTTE
and with relations in India . These families came in
the garb of refugees, registered themselves at the
coastal entry points, and set up base in Chennai
by renting houses in Chennai suburbs, with the
help of their relations in Chennai. Sivarasan used
one of these as his base, and used the other for
Subha and Dhanu, with none being the wiser. The
Sri Lankan Tamils spoke Tamil with a distinct
accent different from the Indian Tamils, and can
be recognised with ease. Besides, Subha and
Dhanu did not know Chennai. They had to
familiarise with Chennai. They needed a
companion, preferably a lady, who could take
them around.
That person was Nalini, Bhagyanathan’s sister. The
LTTE’s mastermind in this operation, Raghuvaran,
who was Murugan’s boss,
introduced Dhanu and
Subha to Nalini for taking them on familiarizing trips
in Chennai, and for a dry run operation by
attending V P Singh’s election meeting in Chennai
a couple of weeks before Rajiv Gandhi’s
assassination. Nalini spent weekends with Subha
and Dhanu showing them Chennai. On the fated
day, she accompanied the assassin Dhanu, and
her companion, Subha, to the spot where Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated.
Earlier in January, 1991, the DMK’S Tamil Nadu
Government had been dismissed on alleged links
with the LTTE, and all known LTTE operatives in
Tamil Nadu were arrested. Their unit had been
infiltrated by the Indian agencies who knew where
to locate them. However, these operativeswere
only from the political group of the LTTE. The
intelligence group led by Sivarasan and Murugan
escaped the notice of the agencies, due to the
advance step taken by the LTTE of not informing
the political group of the assassination plans.The
intelligence group quietly went about setting its
base, and getting ready to assassinate Rajiv
Gandhi.
In the course of these preparations, Sivarasan
required certain items like a car-battery to
operate their HF wireless set to communicate with
his boss in Jaffna ,
and a motor-bike for his local
movements in Chennai. In this, he was helped by
the Indian boy, Arivu, who assisted in purchasing
these items. Sivarasan’s name did not figure in any
records of purchase of these items-it was either
Arivu or Bhagyanathan who made the purchase.
The only record on which Sivarasan himself figured
was when he took a learner’s driving licence for
driving the two-wheeler from the Meenambakkam
RTO’s office with the help of his Indian contacts.
He even got a doctor’s certificate for his eye-sight,
with no indication that he was one-eyed. Between
19, June, 1990 when Padmanabha was
assassinated, and 21 May, 1991, when Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated,
the Indian intelligence
agencies were on the look-out for the LTTE’s oneeyed
Raghuvaran in connection with the
Padmanabha case. But Raghuvaran had reappeared asSivarasan
and the Indian agencies
continued to grope in the dark for Raghuvaranthey had no
photograph of Raghuvaran to help
them.
LTTE operatives brought
gold biscuits from Jaffna
to meet their expenses, and one of their close
supporters in Chennai used to convert these gold
biscuits into cash. Thus Sivarasan did not need to
open a bank account and therefore did not
figure in any bank records. He paid no income
tax, and so there was neither a pan card nor
income tax returns to file.
Sivarasan, Subha,
Dhanu, Murugan and other LTTE operatives did
not figure in immigration records and records like
ration cards, Airlines, Railways, electricity, phone
etc. There was therefore no chance that this
group would have figured in a data base
containing the above records. Their presence in
Chennai therefore could not have been figured
out using a data base of such information.
The NATGRID, which
is a data
base of such
records, therefore would not have been able to
prevent the Rajiv Gandhi assassination. How else
could we have figured out the presence of the
intelligence wing of the LTTE in Chennai? In fact, a
combination of tech-int and human-int had given
one of our agencies the input that the LTTE was
setting up a base for its intelligence wing in
Chennai, and that Muthuraja, the Indian supporter
had been approached by them to introduce his
contacts to their intelligence wing operatives. This
lead unfortunately was not pursued. In early 1991,
Muthuraja left for Jaffna ,
and in mid-sea was
picked up by the Sri Lankan Navy. Thereafter the
lead was completely lost.
II
THE MUMAI TERROR ATTACKS, 26/11
The 26/11 Mumbai attacks were unique in a sense.
For the first time, a group of terrorists came from
the sea into Mumbai and targeted elite hotels, a
central railway station thronging with home bound
crowds, a hotel known to be patronised by
foreigners and a Chabad
house giving shelter to
Jews. This attack was planned over a period of
over two years. The person selected to scout for
targets for maximum effect was himself unique.
David Coleman Headley, a swashbuckling
American came to Mumbai, set up an office to
facilitate immigration into the United States as a
cover for his undercover activities, and over a
period of two years, identified targets for the LeT
to attack. This
American was raised in Pakistan
by
his Pakistani father, and grew to hate India . He
spent his adolescent years in the United States ,
where he could change his name to David
Coleman Headley, carrying his American mother’s
name. This was on the suggestion of the LeT, with
which he began his liaison in Pakistan . He went
through several training stints with the LeT, and
also came to be noticed by the ISI. Apart from
arms training and the
usual indoctrination,
Headley was trained to spy and video film
probable targets in India . He was funded by the ISI
on his India
projects. Every time he entered India
or left India ,
his name figured in the immigration
records but raised no suspicion due to his
American passport. Though each time he left
American citizen going to that country. That was
the advantage of Dawood Gilani changing his
name to David Coleman Headley, with his looks
helping in the deceit!
One recalls the instance of the great Israeli spy, Eli
Cohen, born in Egypt who could speak Arabic like
an Arab. He was noticed by the Mossad and
recruited for spying in Syria . He infiltrated into Syria
in the early sixties, and prised out every defence
secret of that State by befriending all the top
politicians in the guise
of a Syrian expatriate
businessman, over a period of four years. No one
who helped him in Damascus
knew he was an
Israeli spy. He acted alone, and used to pass his
secret messages to Israel over wireless channels.
He was arrested and hanged by the Syrians, but
his role was believed to have played a crucial
part in the 1967 blitzkrieg of Israel .
From the lone terrorist arrested on 26/11, we know
the training that Kasab and the nine others had
undergone over a period of several months in
different training camps of the LeT. We also know
how the ten terrorists were dispatched from
Indian vessel in the Arabian Sea ,
and killing its
inmates. From Colaba where they landed, the
terrorists only had to hire taxis and go to the predestined
targets to open fire on innocent people.
Headley had used entry and exit points to get into
our immigration records.
As a foreigner, he would also figure in hotel
records that would be accessible to the
intelligence agencies. As an American citizen,
these records did not raise any suspicion. His
mobile phone connections were not in his name,
and would not have raised any alert. His normal
banking transactions also would not have raised
any alerts on account of his American passport.
The ten terrorists who entered Mumbai for carrying
out the attacks did not come with their passports.
They were to enter India illegally, and would
therefore not figure in any immigration records.
Had Kasab not been arrested by a small team of
local policemen led by an intrepid Assistant SubInspector, Pakistan would
have denied that the
terrorists were from their country. While NATGRID
would have Headley’s immigration record entries
in its data base, along with banking records, it
would have only helped post-26/11 investigations,
rather than in preventing the attack itself. Terrorist
planners take care to avoid figuring in such
records as a matter of abundant precaution.
There is no evidence as yet of any Indian having
helped Headley knowing that he was spying for
the LeT/ISI. Had this been the case, there was a
chance that the Indian agencies would have
found him out, like it happened when the LTTE
asked Muthuraja to introduce his Indian friends to
the intelligence wing operative. Unfortunately, this
vital lead that the Indian agencies got was not
pursued to its logical conclusion.
The NATGRID would be welcomed by all Indian
security and investigation agencies, for it is one
more data base with records of 21 agencies
pertaining to diverse activities of individuals that
can be accessed and used by these agencies in
the course of their work. But there is no substitute
for human intelligence-it is certainly far more
difficult and challenging, but far more useful and
effective.
IPCS July 2011
