The assault mounted by the Black Tigers on the Katunayake
Airbase on 24 July 2001 had convinced the government of the day that the
only way to peace was through talks with the Tigers. Earlier, in the mid-nineties,
the SLFP government of Chandrika Kumaratunge had tried to talk peace, and
failing in that had gone to war with the LTTE. Even though the government's
Operation Jayasikuru had initially netted a few successes, the LTTE had hit
back effectively through its Operation Unceasing Waves. Thereafter, the Sri
Lankan state took recourse to air power, with the Tigers getting hit and
only a few successful counter hits. It was in this background, and after
warnings that they would hit back if the state did not put a stop to
indiscriminate bombings of civilian areas, that the LTTE mounted a major
operation against the Katunayake airbase, destroying a sizeable number of
military and civilian aircrafts, and delivering a stunning blow to the
morale of the security forces.
There are yet no clear indications as to whether the state
has been able to work out as to how the LTTE was able to mount such a
precise, but devastating operation in the Sri Lankan capital, by land. The
detailed planning of the operation, and the logistics involved, showed that
the Tigers supremo had lost none of his penchant for taking the fight to
the enemy, when appearing to be in a lost position.
The split in the LTTE in early 2004 appeared to have sapped
the Tigers' fighting abilities and the state, under a new, aggressive
president appeared to be on the ascendant. Once again, the LTTE was on the
back foot, fighting for survival in the north. The air force had become
potent and was inflicting heavy losses on the LTTE, both in human and
material terms. Prabhakaran's image had taken a beating even among his
supporters. He had to show that his movement was very much alive and
kicking as much for the morale of his troops as to retain hold over the
Tamils, especially those abroad who have been great sources of support for
the LTTE, financially and politically.
The Tigers have surprised friends and foes alike with their
organizing and fighting capabilities. Their Black Tiger operations have all
been carefully planned in great secrecy, and after several dry runs. Each
such operation is planned for strategic gains, short term losses
notwithstanding.
The attack from air on the Sri Lankan airbase during the
night hours is one such carefully crafted operation of the Tigers. In one
stroke, the Tigers have made several telling points. They have demonstrated
their air capability, howsoever minor it may be, and that too in night
operations with night landing facility, wherever they operate from. They
have given notice of future strikes, raising security concerns, but most
importantly, they have also demonstrated the intelligence failure of the
foe. Their pilots would have conducted sorties in the Vanni for practice
and their intelligence would have gathered inputs about the weak points of
the Sri Lankan Air Force. They have also demonstrated their abilities to
use such light aircraft for bombing operations by developing the requisite
delivery systems.
It is not clear how many such aircrafts are available with
the LTTE (even though reports suggest that they have two), or how many
combat pilots they have trained, and where they received such training. The
LTTE released photographs of Prabhakaran with a few pilots. And a light
aircraft in which two pilots were seated. Whether they are actually pilots,
or whether this was to put the Sri Lankans off their trail is not clear.
Whether they have only one runway at Iranamadu (there are reports of two)
or more than one, though effectively camouflaged from prying eyes, is also
not clear. What is however clear, is that the LTTE has made a bold
statement in the fight against the government forces in order to achieve
their goals. They have carefully chosen to hit military installations, and
avoided civilian casualties unlike what they allege the Sri Lankan
government has been doing. Even though the government and security pundits
were aware of the air wing of the LTTE, they would nevertheless be
compelled to take note of this new development. Prabhakaran has once again
given notice that he can raise the stakes in this unfortunate fratricidal
war, and that the final dialogue, whenever that takes place, will not have
him cowering and pleading for peace.
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