In a recent Track-II
event held in Bangkok between Indian and
Pakistani experts under the Chaophraya Dialogue promoted by the Jinnah
Institute at Islamabad and the Australia-India
Institute at Melbourne, the Pakistanis
insisted that India
should try and understand General Kayani - that he is different and thinks
differently, and that he is keen to improve India-Pakistan relations.
The Indians, however, pointed out that the General had openly referred to
the Pakistan Army being India-centric. One also recalled that when
President Zardari announced, immediately after the 26/11 attack on Mumbai
by the LeT that ISI Chief Shuja Ahmed Pasha would visit Delhi which was overturned reportedly
under pressure of the Army Chief. Earlier, the new civilian government in Islamabad had issued
an order bringing the ISI under the Interior Ministry headed by Rehman
Malik, an ex-cop. But this decision of the government also was overturned,
again under the pressure from the army. It was clear who was most powerful
in the Pakistan
hierarchy.
While Indians knew that the 26/11 attack on Mumbai emanated from Pakistan,
which was later confirmed by the arrested terrorist Ajmal Kasab, the
subsequent disclosures of David Headley @ Dawood Gilani to the FBI and the
NIA’s sleuths have brought in the role of a couple of majors of the ISI in
training and funding Headley to do reconnaissance of the targets in Mumbai
and elsewhere in India. It may be recalled that General Kayani was earlier
the head of the ISI before taking over as Army Chief. India has
no proof whether the Army Chief or even the ISI Chief General Shuja Pasha
was in the picture about the 26/11 attack. However, India is aware of the close relationship
between the ISI and the Lashkar-e-Tayeba, which has a lot of support of the
Army establishment in Pakistan
that has allowed it to grow into a powerful non-state actor.
The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in
July 2008, allegedly by the Haqqani group of the Taliban, was according to
reliable intelligence reports, carried out at the behest of the ISI to
deter India from getting
close to Afghanistan.
There have been other attacks on Indian interests and personnel in Kabul, also carried
out by the Haqqani group under orders of the ISI. With the above
background, it was difficult for some of the Indian participants to accept
the view that General Kayani was different, and is keen on developing good
relations with India.
Yet, the latest incident involving the straying of an Indian Army
helicopter into Pakistan occupied Kashmir on 23 October on way from Leh to
Kargil to assist another one which had developed some technical snag gives
some hope that there may be some merit in the argument that General Kayani
after all, would like good relations with India. According to reports
emanating from India,
an Army helicopter which had taken off from Leh at about 1 p.m. with 2
pilots and two technical personnel, including an engineer, to assist
another helicopter that had been grounded, strayed into Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir due to inclement weather. Reports from Pakistan
said that the helicopter deliberately entered Pakistan air space in the
Skardu sector, and there was a Lt. Colonel, two majors and an NCO in it,
that it was forced to land by the Pakistanis and that all four crew members
were in safe custody.
That set the stage for some intense communication between the Indian and
Pakistani Directors General of Military Operations, as well as the Indian High
Commission with the Pakistan Foreign ministry. The Indians apparently were
able to convince the Pakistanis that the straying of the helicopter into
their territory was accidental and not deliberate, and in about five hours
the Indian helicopter and the crew members were allowed to return to own
base. This certainly could not have happened without the blessings of
General Kayani, and gives some hope of better relations between the two
countries, given the General’s standing in the government. India has appreciated “the manner in which Pakistan
worked with us in resolving the matter.” It may be remembered that
the Abbotabad operation of the Americans in May this year is fresh in the
minds of the Pakistani GHQ. Yet, the manner of handling of the incident by
GHQ was professional and quick.
While this gives some hope of better future relations there were reports on
the same day of Pakistani troops resorting to firing on Indian forward
posts along the Line of Control in Jammu
and Kashmir’s Poonch district after our forces
detected an infiltration bid by militants. The terrorist infrastructure is
very much in place in Pakistan,
and the GHQ has not ruled out the option of using it. While hoping for
better relations with Pakistan,
we should also be cautious in moving ahead with the GHQ.
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