Two scholars of the New York University, Alex Strick van
Linshoten and Felix Kuehn, who have spent years in Afghanistan, have come
out with a report that the Taliban has been wrongly perceived as
ideological ally of al Qaeda, and that the guerrilla group can be persuaded
to renounce al Qaeda. The report claims that there was substantial friction
between the groups’ leaders before 9/11, and the hostility has only
intensified. The authors argue that intensified operations against the
Taliban may make it harder to reach a settlement, and that attacks on
Taliban field commanders and provincial leaders will leave the movement
open to younger and more radical elements. This will result in the al Qaeda
getting more influence over the Taliban. The report suggests that the United States
government should engage older Taliban leaders before they lose control of
the movement.
Osama bin Laden had settled in Afghanistan
in early 1996, after he was compelled to leave Sudan due to international
pressure on that government. SteveColl, in his magnificent work Ghost Wars
haswritten about the lavish construction projects and generous donations
that bin Laden made to the Taliban’s coffers when it was struggling
to establish itself in Afghanistan.
This fostered an intimate relationship between bin Laden and the Taliban
leadership.
From the time of President Clinton, the US
tried through Pakistan
to convince the Taliban to handover Laden to the Americans to stand trial
for the attacks on American targets. Though the Taliban was not recognized
by the US,
through informal contacts they also tried to get custody of bin Laden, but
the Taliban just ignored the request. It is known that even after the 9/11
attacks on the twin World Trade Centre
Towers, the Taliban refused to
hand over bin Laden to the United States
despite attempts by Pakistan
to convince them of the threat of war by an enraged United States.
According to Sajjan Gohel, Director of International Security, Asia Pacific
Foundation, “the Taliban remained loyal to al-Qaeda. There is an
ideological connection: al Qaeda adopts a very strict interpretation of the
Quran that is Wahabi/Salafi-esque; the Taliban is Deobandi. The
relationship is close ideologically, and it is that relationship that binds
them together. The Taliban is a number of different factions--whether you
are looking at the Haqqani network (based in the city of Khost
and led by a popular warlord, JalaluddinHaqqani), or the Quetta Council
(led by Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar) but they are based in Pakistan.
In addition, they receive support from the Pakistan Taliban, (which is)
already ideologically intertwined with groups like al Qaeda; and that is
why al Qaeda Central, the Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic movement of
Uzbekistan, and a whole plethora of groups are based in the tribal
areas-because of the Taliban code of allowing these groups to be based
there in providing sanctuary, in supporting them. That is not going to
change.”
According to Ronald E. Neumann, President, American Academy of Diplomacy
and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, “This idea that if the Taliban
comes back, al Qaeda either doesn't come with them or is controllable or
isn't a threat - is a very speculative theoretical foundation. This seems
to me a very speculative basis, which has no real solid evidence to support
it, on which to take a very large national security risk…”
In an interview to Al Arabia TV, Abdul Salaam Zaeef, the former Ambassador
of the Taliban to Pakistan, said that the Americans had only one demand, to
handover Osama bin Laden to them. He said they offered to try bin Laden in Afghanistan,
if the Americans provided evidence. According to Zaeef, the Americans
refused to understand Afghan traditions and culture, and that the Taliban
had to defend the country’s independence, as a religious responsibility.
According to Ahmed Rashid, the respected Pakistani columnist, the Taliban
leadership is sheltered by Pakistan
in safe houses. Though they are grateful to Pakistan for the shelter
provided to them, they are resentful of the constant Pakistani meddling in
their internal affairs. The fact that the Taliban resented Pakistani
interference in their affairs is also mentioned by Zaeef in his book “My
life with the Taliban.”
There is thus enough indication that the Taliban and al Qaeda are
ideologically close to each other, and therefore there is no certainty that
they can be made to renounce the al-Qaeda. There is evidence that the
Taliban have withstood pressure from Pakistan on crucial matters of
importance to them. There is evidence that they resented interference from Pakistan in
their internal affairs. Before 9/11, Pakistan
sold the line to the United States
that the Taliban can be brought round, and that the United States
should engage with the Taliban. The same line is being sold now. There is
indication that Pakistan
cannot guarantee what the Taliban would do once in power. In this scenario,
it would be a huge risk to base any major decision on the premise that the
Taliban can be convinced to renounce the al Qaeda.
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