Pakistan gambit in Afghanistan

By Radhavinod Raju

Pakistan kept its threat to boycott the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan which took place on December 5, where over a hundred countries participated and renewed their commitments for peace, stability and development of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s proxies, the Afghan Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, headquartered in Quetta, also boycotted the conference, rendering the conference itself meaningless if the aim was to reconcile the different warring Afghan groups. In these circumstances, there was no question of the Haqqani group, operating mainly from North Waziristan, taking part in the conference. This is following a pre-dawn airborne NATO attack on two Pakistani posts on the Af-Pak border in Mohmand Agency on November 26, resulting in the deaths of 26 Pakistani soldiers.

This ‘unprovoked’ attack has once again raised a serious question mark on Pak-US strategic relationship, and their war on terror. Apart from boycotting the conference, the other major actions taken by Pakistan is to block the supplies to the NATO war effort, which pass through Pakistan, and is vital for their operations in Afghanistan; asking the United States to vacate the Shamsi Air Base in Balochistan from where the drones were being operated against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in North and South Waziristan, and; the decision to revisit the terms of their engagement with the United States and NATO/ISAF ‘on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual interest and mutual respect’. Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said that “our willingness to cooperate with the international community on counter-terrorism has not been understood in its proper perspective. The notion to give Pakistan a ‘to do’ list and the mantra of ‘do more’ have caused immense resentment”.

Relations between the ‘strategic partners’ had been spiralling downwards following the Raymond Davis affair early this year, after the Pakistani police arrested the American for shooting and killing two people who allegedly wanted to rob him. He was reported to be working with the CIA, tracking militants in remote areas. His alleged links with the CIA further exacerbated the relations, with Islamabad demanding to reduce the number of CIA intelligence operatives in Pakistan. Though the Americans succeeded in getting Davis released from custody and had him whisked away home after paying blood money, relations were no longer the same between the partners. It was on top of this that the US Navy SEALs flew into Abbottabad in helicopters and eliminated the world’s most wanted terrorist, al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. The Americans showed scant regard for Pakistani ‘sovereignty’ and the successful operation was a slap on the face of the Pakistani generals whose image in the country took a beating. To tell the country and the world that bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, close to an important army establishment, during the last nearly five years, was not known to the ISI was bad enough. To admit their failure to detect the movement of the SEALs’ helicopters into Pakistan from their base in Afghanistan, and their presence in Abbottabad for nearly an hour, must have been a humiliation too hard to digest. President Barack Obama’s statement from London that they will not hesitate to repeat the operation were they to get intelligence about a high-value target in Pakistan only worsened matters.

Not that the Taliban and the Haqqani group were silent during all this time. The killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was leading the High Peace Council of Afghan President Haimd Karzai for talks with various Afghan groups, including the Taliban, was a Taliban operation. Pakistan and the Taliban were unhappy with the initiative taken by Karzai to talk to all the Afghan groups without taking Pakistan on board. The Haqqani group was responsible for a spectacular attack in Kabul, targeting the US Embassy and NATO headquarters. This attack prompted the retiring US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to call the Haqqani group a “veritable arm of the ISI”. Though the United States government disassociated itself from Mullen’s claim, many influential Americans supported the admiral’s conclusion.

Pakistan is not happy about the strategic partnership that the Afghanistan government has signed with India, with provisions for training the Afghan security forces in India. General Kayani is worried about the Indian ‘mind-set’ that the Afghans would acquire in this process. The United States is also working out a strategic partnership with the Afghanistan government, indicating that the US will not pack up and leave Afghanistan. They have plans to retain bases in Afghanistan, and keep a sharp eye on forces hostile to them planning attacks on their homeland. Both these developments would check Pakistani ambitions in Afghanistan — this is an emerging situation that Pakistan dislikes.

It was in these circumstances that the NATO/ISAF attack took place on the Pakistani posts. The question is whether the Americans would go for such an attack in the background of worsening Pak-US ties risking their vital supplies to Afghanistan and the impending Bonn Conference on Afghanistan’s future, unless there was some grave provocation, calling for the attack. The Bonn Conference was important for the Americans with their presidential elections round the corner, and their plans to exit from Afghanistan depending on Pakistan and their influence with the Taliban. America invited Pakistan to join the investigations into the mishap, but the latter refused. So who provoked the attack?

The current impasse has suited Pakistan, or rather, the ‘Deep State’ as the army establishment is known there. They would like to play an important role in any plans for Afghanistan, keeping India out. The American dependence on Pakistan for getting their supplies to Afghanistan is well known. The northern route through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is not good enough for the supplies to reach the NATO/ISAF, and is fraught with uncertainties more acute than those in Pakistan. Pakistan hopes that the US will finally come round to seeing their point of view. This probably explains Pakistan’s brinkmanship in boycotting the Bonn Conference, in spite of repeated calls from Washington for its participation.

(Views expressed in the column are the author’s own) 

Radhavinod Raju 

is a former director general of the National Investigation Agency. E-mail:  radhavinodraju@gmail.com 

New Indian Express

19th December 2011