Missing links in security

By Radhavinod Raju

General Parvez Kayani and his ISI chief, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha must be going through a very difficult period in the wake of the successful US operation in Abbottabad that eliminated Osama bin Laden. They have to either admit a grave intelligence failure in not being aware of Osama’s presence in Abbottabad for over five years, or admit to their complicity in keeping him in that mansion, away from the prying eyes of their strategic partner. Pasha has nevertheless come out with threatening statements directed at India, that Pakistan would counter-attack if India were to mount a Abbottabad-type operation in Pakistan, and that targets in India have been identified and rehearsals carried out. The ISI chief has forgotten the tremendous restraint shown by the political leadership of this country in the wake of Mumbai 26/11 attacks, which would have been the right time for a surgical strike against terrorist targets in Pakistan.

We, however, need to review our own arrangements to defend our country and our people from the depredations of terrorists from across our border. How adequately are we protected against terrorist attacks? Which are the agencies charged with the responsibility of protecting us, and our sensitive installations? Do they have the necessary wherewithal to discharge their responsibilities? That includes the best weapons in the market for urban and rural asymmetric war that terrorists can unleash, protective gear that strengthens the morale of our officers, intelligence backup, both human and technical, mobility to reach action spots, etc.

We have the army, the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Force, the Sashastra Seema Bal, the Assam Rifles and the navy and coast guard to guard our land and maritime boundaries. We have so far not faced any terrorist attack from the sky other than hijacking of our aircraft which took place due to failure at check points. The Rashtriya Rifles, the CRPF and the state police forces perform counter-terrorism and insurgency duties in states like Jammu & Kashmir which are affected by terrorism. The National Security Guards, Rashtriya Rifles and Special Operations Groups aided by the CRPF in states like J&K take on terrorists when there are encounters in built-in areas. The Central Industrial Security Force protects our vital installations. The Intelligence Bureau, the Research & Analysis Wing, Military Intelligence and in the states the CID Special Branch and the District Special Branch provide the intelligence back-up.

Despite this anti-terror infrastructure, terrorists have succeeded in breaching our defence lines, on land and sea, and have unleashed terror on trains, on iconic targets like our Parliament, the J&K Assembly, the IISc, in markets like Sarojini Nagar in Delhi and so on. Months after 26/11, David Headley, the American-born ISI/LeT agent who had scouted for targets for 26/11, visited India again. He still came here to scout for more targets eluding our agencies.

If there has been no major terrorist attack on Indian targets after 26/11, except for the German Bakery blast in Pune in February 2010, and a few minor blasts in UP and Bangalore, it appears to be more because of the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan and its ‘Deep State’ consisting of the army and the ISI combine.

While our security apparatus has been working day and night to prevent any terrorist attack, the ISI can still manage to mount attacks in our country. This threat is more acute in Kashmir.

One reason is the sheer size of India, with our democracy and open society, due to which it is almost impossible to prevent every breach of security. Another reason is the tiny but vicious group of radicals in the minority community that has come up due to the long history of communal attacks on them in India and the lackadaisical manner in which our police have investigated cases against perpetrators of such attacks, shaking the faith of the minorities in the criminal justice system. These radicals have come handy to the ISI to strike anywhere in India.

Do we have a national database of the different terrorist groups, of their leaders, of their modus operandi, of their financing processes, of their area of operations, of their support base and of the dozens of ISI sleeper cells? While the IB maintains records, these are of little use when we have to ask for an extradition, or try convincing other countries of the machinations of the ISI and its nexus with terrorist groups because of a lack of prosecutable and credible evidence. Azhar Masood was in our custody from 1994, but in the absence of investigation into his offences, we could not prosecute him in our courts.

What about the investigating agencies of the country, including the CBI and the state crime branches? They will have records of the cases investigated by them, but whether the cases are inter-connected, whether they bear the stamp of a particular militant group, its modus operandi, etc may remain buried in the records.

While for special operations we have NSG based in Delhi, with hubs in Mumbai, Hyderabad and Kolkata, they will still take time to reach the site of action based on where terrorists attack. Further, NSG will lack local knowledge due to which there is a good chance of unacceptable collateral damage. It would therefore be best if we train our state police in commando operations as the J&K police have done, with appropriate weapons, protective gear and training. With their local knowledge, they will be able to undertake pinpointed action to neutralise terrorists.

Now that we have a counter-terrorism agency in the National Investigation Agency, they should immediately embark on preparing a comprehensive database of every known terrorist and terrorist group, its modus operandi, type of arms and explosives used, local support base, type of financial transactions and so on.

The most important factor is coordination between the various field and intelligence agencies and the investigation units. Information has to be shared in time; investigations and operations have to be conducted in time. Very often there is lack of trust, and one-upmanship between different agencies. They have to realise that in this game, the only way that works well is the one that boldly says ‘all for one and one for all’. Sometime back, there was a talk of all the central investigation and intelligence agencies being brought under a National Counter Terrorism Centre. This would have addressed the problem of coordination. It is not known whether this plan is still under consideration, or dropped.

New Indian Express

18th May 2011